Future of Globalisation provides a platform for debates on current world economic issues, global power shifts and the roles of formal and informal global governance institutions and relevant networks.
The current debate on the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement could be very consequential for the World Trade Organization (WTO) although it is not part of the official calendar of next week’s 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13) in Abu Dhabi. (mehr …)
© European Union / David Martin, Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/cor-photos/53379323878/in/album-72177720313008202/
When Sultan Al-Jaber, the United Emirates of Arabia President of COP28, finally presented an amended text for adoption in the closing plenary, the EU seemed relieved: For the first time in 30 years of climate negotiations, the decision now explicitly addressed fossil fuels. At last years “COP27” UN climate change conference, the EU took many by surprise with a gamble it appeared to have taken. Europe conceded to developing countries’ demands with regard to establishing a designated funding mechanism to deal with loss and damage resulting from climate change literally in an overnight turnaround. It had expected to yield returns with regard to mitigation ambition, yet, these did not materialize at COP27. Following the establishment of the Transitional Committee there was no way back for the EU in the run up to COP28. Indeed, the EU now needed to be seen to walk the talk and deliver on loss and damage finance, which in fact it has done. Still, return on investment, if you will, remained uncertain until the very last hours of extra-time at this year’s COP28.
As a top priority for COP28, the EU’s aim was to land a deal on the „phase-out“ of fossil fuels and the „phase-in“ of renewable energy. While the final decision falls short of the desired wording on fossil-fuel phase out, it does introduce the „transitioning away from fossil fuels“, which signifies nothing less but a game changer. Moreover, the decision includes the tripling of renewable energy and doubling of energy efficiency by 2030 as initiated by the EU ahead of COP28. This led EU Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra to conclude that: “The world just adopted a historic decision at COP 28 to set in motion an irreversible, accelerated transition away from fossil fuels. With that, we have achieved what we set out to do: keep 1.5 within reach and mark the beginning of the end of fossil fuels“.
While it is hard to assess the EU’s specific role in securing this outcome, it is fair to appraise its consistency in „holding the line“- a metaphor used by civil society organisations to refer to the need to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as stipulated in the Paris Agreement. The EU’s Green Deal and its domestic climate law which entails a reduction of CO2 emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels underpinned European delegates with the necessary self-confidence to do so and to present itself once more as a global leader on climate policy. Moreover, the EU can claim to be the world’s largest provider of climate finance for developing countries – an achievement that shines all the brighter in the glaring contrast to the US, among others, who have been failing to contribute their fair share for a long time. Accordingly, Teresa Ribeira, the Spanish environment minister who led the EU Delegation on behalf of the Spanish Presidency, as well as a host of EU representatives including German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, could authentically threaten to not accept a COP outcome that would be way below the EU’s expectations. It also made the EU a credible partner for the so-called “High Ambition Coalition” (HAC) of countries, prominently including the Alliance of Small Island States among others, which insisted on fossil-fuel phase out. It is here, arguably, that the EU’s upfront investment on Loss and Damage eventually payed off. On balance, the EU did everything that was needed to „hold the line“ of including fossil fuel language into the final decision as a means to keep 1.5 degrees within reach.
This was no mean feat – as was evidenced by the fierce negotiations throughout the two weeks of COP28. While in the past, the EU has often struggled to present a united position in UN climate change negotiations, it came to Dubai well-prepared and with an ambitious negotiating mandate. Throughout COP 28, the EU managed to stand and act together – most notably when the UAE Presidency presented a draft final text for the first Global Stocktake that many parties – including the EU – considered inadequate. Unambiguously and jointly stating that the EU was not willing to accept this outcome, it kept engaging in particular through the High-Ambition Coalition to secure a substantially improved deal.
Yet, there is little reason for exuberance. The real-world impact of the unprecedented, but lukewarm language on fossil fuels remains to be seen. And there remain a number of unresolved issues and unfinished business that are hardly less important in comprehensively meeting the objectives of the Paris Agreement, not least with regard to adapting to climate change consequences that can no longer be avoided.
With regards to adaptation, the EU in Dubai failed to send strong signals of solidarity with the most vulnerable countries. The EU did not stand up strongly for an ambitious Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and the establishment of a framework that can guide nations in their efforts to adapt to climate change and promote climate-resilient development. While the GGA has formally been adopted in Dubai, it falls disappointingly short of quantifiable financial targets and a clear recognition of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities. Here, the EU chose to side with other wealthy countries, most notably the US, in not supporting more ambitious outcomes, mainly referring to the existing goal of doubling adaptation finance and the upcoming process of defining a new collective quantified goal (NCQG).
The EU will need to step up its game ahead of COP 29 in Azerbaijan. While rightly pointing to the large shares of climate finance it provides, the EU failed to act convincingly as “Team Europe” at the COP stage in this respect. At the start of COP 28, the COP Presidency landed two coups: a swift adoption of the agenda and the adoption of the framework of the new loss and damage fund. Together with Germany, it also presented the first pledges of 100 million each to the fund, hoping to unlock other countries’ contributions. During this opening plenary, other European governments came in -notably France, Italy and Denmark- to announce their bilateral contributions. Very good – and yet, the spokesperson for the Spanish Presidency was left to sum up these contributions and present them as a „Team Europe“. Imagine if the EU had opened the COP with a joint pledge of almost half a billion! That would have been a truly strong European signal and could be an important lesson for future EU announcements on adaptation and the NCQG.
Moreover, the decision on transitioning from fossil fuels is not supported by a package of support for developing countries to decarbonise their economies and to invest in renewables. While this weak support for so-called means of implementation is not only the EU’s fault, it also did not demonstrate leadership in this respect. In particular with regard to the Just Transition Work Programme, there remains a clear divide between the G77+ and rich countries, with the former advocating for more far-reaching visions of just transition (to address all of society, economy, justice and equity) and wealthy countries merely calling for social dialogue and stakeholder participation around Just Transitions.
In addition, when deciding on its own position in the process to define the new finance goal by then end of 2024 (the NCQG) the EU needs to be aware of the expectations of developing countries (represented as the G77 plus China in the UNFCCC). In Dubai, the EU used every opportunity to refer to the need to make all financial flows consistent with climate change and by this mainly refers to the alignment of private capital towards climate action. This is reasonable, knowing how difficult it will be for many member states to provide significantly larger amounts as public climate finance. Yet, the EU’s stance risks a rift with the G77 and China which has already stated in Dubai that it would not support such a position, referring to the provisions under the Paris Agreement that requires developed countries to assist developing countries to address mitigation and adaptation. Add this to the EU’s position to extend the contributor base of climate finance (indirectly pointing at China and other emerging economies) and you know how far positions are still apart.
Finally, the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) continues to stir controversies. Following Brazil’s request on behalf of the so-called BASIC group of countries (Brazil, China, India and South Africa), COP28 adopted an agenda item on “Concerns with unilateral trade measures related to Climate Change “, obviously targeting CBAM. The EU repeatedly stated CBAM was not coming up as an issue in the negotiating rooms, but will rather be dealt with under the WTO. However, it is clear that developing countries affected by CBAM expect greater financial and technical support packages from the EU to adapt.
Brief, the EU needs to brace itself for COP29 – complacency is never a good adviser. The Union needs to further ‚capitalize‘ on the investments it has been making, and to build on the (renewed) trust it has been generating in the context of the High-Ambition Coaliton: clear support for means of implementation and new and additional sources of funding, an ambitious collectively quantified goal with public finance at its core and much stronger support for adaptation ahead of the new round of enhanced Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) that are due in 2025.
The BRICS group – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – invite six countries to join them for a BRICS+. The final list of invitees is an odd bunch: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran from the Middle East, Argentina from Latin America and Egypt and Ethiopia from Africa, with the former also being an Arab state. This decision on specific members came after apparently tough discussions amongst current membership, as interests varied widely. Yet, the return of geopolitics seems to have revitalised a disparate group. Why (only) these six, what are likely effects on international relations, and who’s benefitting most?
By CherryX per Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0
The EU has long prided itself on being a leading supporter of international democratic change. Its development cooperation budget for the period 2021-2027 has allocated €1.5 billion for a dedicated ‘Thematic Programme on Human Rights and Democracy’. The EU has also joined forces with several of its member states to pursue a Team Europe Initiative on Democracy to strengthen the collective visibility, effectiveness and impact of their various democracy support programmes.
In her last annual State of the Union address to the European Parliament, European Commission President von der Leyen called for a rethink of the EU’s foreign policy agenda. Reflecting on the global implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, she considered that “this is the time to invest in the power of democracies”. Although “our friends in every single democratic nation on this globe” form a core group of like-minded partners with which the EU seeks to shape global goods, von der Leyen also recognised the need to engage beyond the EU’s democratic partners – including through its Global Gateway infrastructure investment initiative. The EU’s efforts to become energy-independent from Russia underlines the need for a broad engagement, but also highlights the challenge of doing so in a way that is consistent with its democracy promotion commitments. One example of this tension was von der Leyen’s presence at the opening of the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria pipeline that enables direct gas imports from Azerbaijanregime has been accused of carrying out an extensive crackdown on civil and political liberties in recent years. The EU’s credibility and effectiveness as a democracy promotion actor requires awareness of this tension between its commitment to democracy and its economic interests.
Notwithstanding its tensions with other policy fields, the EU’s democracy support itself often inadvertently contributes to enabling authoritarianism. In the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood regions, for instance, the EU’s democracy support had the unintended effect of strengthening illiberal reform coalitions. In the South-Caucasus region, political incumbents used EU-supported anti-corruption projects to discredit their political opponents, which in turn weakened the EU’s legitimacy among liberal-minded voters. Research on EU democracy support in Sub-Saharan Africa describes how authoritarian regimes have acted to counteract international democracy support, e.g. in Ethiopia where the authorities further restricted the space for civil society.
Moreover, other than failing to prevent undemocratic actors from taking nefarious counter measures, the ways in which EU democracy support is delivered may work against the very “democrats” it seeks to support. For example, international democracy support has sometimes eroded the transformational potential of civil society organisations. Dependence on external funding, implementation requirements (e.g. logframes and reporting) and the increased exposure to being labelled as foreign agents that both encompass has often contributing to these organizations prioritising more depoliticised, “tame” forms of democracy support.
Also, despite a self-proclaimed “turn to resilience”, EU democracy support often risks impeding the very structures that make a society resilient. For instance, analysis of the EU’s democracy support in the Acholi region in Uganda shows how the EU’s prioritization of youths risks causing further generational tensions among an already fractured society. Rather than engaging with different local imaginaries of what is considered “freedom” or “justice”, the EU assumes that poverty and lack of skills prevent these local communities from sufficiently imagining and claiming political rights and civil liberties. Consequently, the EU’s support is predominantly targeted at empowering Acholi youths in terms of individual entrepreneurship, particularly in the most remote rural communities. Yet, many of those communities understand such emphasis on the individual as well as the exclusion of other important members of society, i.e. the elders, to represent a fundamental corruption of Acholi society and its values, and to be disconnected from their needs and concerns. In addition, it should also be noted that such international support as provided by the EU does little to curb the power of the authoritarian government over this region, on the contrary. Since the government increasingly emphasises the need for privatisation and job creation, any effort to engage these youths in terms of business development is likely to appease an important section of society with which the authoritarian Ugandan government increasingly struggles to create legitimacy.
These examples underline that EU cooperation initiatives are introduced in complex multi-actor settings and as such are inherently political. While international development policy debates are continuously looking into how to improve and apply frameworks and approaches that are sensitive to the contexts in which these interventions are made – e.g. “Thinking and Working Politically” – such sensitivity nevertheless often prioritizes consideration of how the local context might affect the external interventions concerned, rather than vice-versa. These frameworks also tend to too narrowly focus on project implementation, without allowing to assess the intended and unintended effects of the EU’s wider engagement in the country and regions concerned.
Beyond satisfying academic inquiry, analysing and acknowledging the (un)intended effects of EU democracy support within the wider context of its external action brings two potential gains. First of all, it will allow us to learn more about the effectiveness of the specific budgets set aside for democracy support abroad. Secondly, such a broad inquiry will both allow us to learn more about how the EU is perceived by its partners – who generally look beyond individual projects when forming such appreciations over time – and also signal the EU’s willingness to learn from its international cooperation efforts. The latter would be a key condition to practicing in international cooperation what it funds in partner contexts: promoting open and responsive societies.
Authors: Niels Keijzer (German Institute of Development and Sustainability) & Nathan Vandeputte (Ghent Institute for International and European Studies, Ghent University)
About: This blog was developed in the context of the MORDOR project, an education and research project that looks into authoritarianism and EU democracy support, co-funded by the Erasmus Plus program of the European Union. More information: https://mordorproject.eu/
In the last couple of years, the reassessment of the Sustainable Development Agenda has become more relevant. As the world enters a new phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, characterised by lower numbers of infections and deaths, the apparition of new variants of the virus, and considerable economic and social challenges, several issues have become more urgent. These include the adaptation capabilities and resilience that are required of societies in the face of social isolation and economic conversion policies; the realisation that mental health is as important as physical health; the wider inequalities affecting the young and women regarding poverty, lack of decent work, and the burden of childcare; the difficulties of ensuring access to technology; and the impact of these matters in our (changed) expectations on the State. These factors have emphasised that the Sustainable Development Agenda is ultimately a governance agenda, in the sense that they overcome the usual governability concerns with a focus that identifies interdependencies with non-governmental actors.
The post pandemic evaluation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has produced a continuum of positions, ranging from the reiteration of the Goals as the blueprint and “compass” for “building forward better” , to the call for their substitution by a “post 2030 utopia”. As it is always the case with complex problems, the solution lies somewhere in the middle, developing sophisticated approaches that allow making the necessary adjustments without compromising the improvements already made.
The “middle approach” is typical of governance dynamics. By this I do not mean that SDGs are a good governance agenda – that is, one that focuses on voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, governmental effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and the control of corruption, as the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators propose. Rather governance in the sense that Sustainable Development requires the cooperation of governments, civil society, and private companies to deal with complex or wicked problems. In its most fundamental, governance is formed by the co-definition of shared goals and the inter-organisational and inter-sectoral processes to achieve them. It requires effective governments, but it goes beyond them, incorporating non-governmental actors that behave as stakeholders in the solution of common problems. It usually implies flexible arrangements, typically networks; but includes wider socio-political, institutional, and civic-culture frameworks that enable a common understanding of the problem, processes of co-construction of solutions, and rules of the game that maintain conflict at manageable levels.
Governance theories have been criticised for not being consolidated enough to offer effective analytical tools to actually solve problems; being one of the most important how to ensure cooperation among actors and coherence among objectives. The do-it-by-yourself definition of the national indicators for SDGs assumes, too easily, that all the actions conducted by public, social, and private actors will virtuously contribute to the solution of the problems behind the indicators. Advancement in one SDG, however, does not necessarily ensure advancement in the rest of them, despite the argument posed by the United Nations regarding “the interlinkages and integrated nature of the Sustainable Development Goals”.Governance is not only “technical”; it requires a new style of leadership that recognises the political dimension of cooperation and policy coherence. The tensions between traditional rule of law solutions (mostly hierarchical, based on the implementation of conventionality control measures), on the one hand, and the more selective approach of SDGs (mostly horizontal, based on inter-organisational cooperation), on the other, offer a good example of the political nature of governance. Generating a more or less common approach to Sustainable Development requires a combination of traditional and new solutions, in a mix that varies according to context.
The governance approach to Sustainable Development recognises that, in spite of the possible measures and indicators that can be reached and adjusted with time, it remains a horizon that can never be completely fulfilled. In that sense, at least in a very fundamental dimension, SDGs will remain a project of multi-level governance with different co-existing conditions and speeds. By implication, Sustainable Development as governance entails the acknowledgement of the partial usefulness of governance literature to deal with complex problems, addressing the challenges of steering, the re-definition of new priorities among the SDGs in the post-pandemic world, the assignation of funds to those new priorities, and the discussion – again – on how to adjust the right indicators to empower public, social, and private actors as the different SDGs develop in space and time.
The future of a post-pandemic 2030 Agenda might require a reclassification of priorities, the effective increase in coordination capabilities, and fostering cooperation in the lines described here. This, in turn, calls for the rethinking of the integrated nature of SDGs that assumes that the 17 Goals are equally important, in all places, all the time.