China foregoes Special and Differential Treatment at the WTO – Real game-changer or geopolitical symbolism?

China’s decision to drop the Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) at the World Trade Organization (WTO) is less a legal earthquake than a strategic signal — but its symbolism matters. Announced by Premier Li Qiang on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, the move to forego the SDT that comes with being labelled a “developing country” in the WTO allows Beijing to claim a form of “grown‑up” membership in the global trading order while recalibrating its diplomacy toward key trade partners and developing countries.

SDT exists for a reason. It offers “developing countries” longer transition periods, technical assistance and flexibility in implementing WTO commitments — measures intended to accommodate capacity constraints and institutional weaknesses. For decades, China claimed the “developing country” status while it industrialized at breakneck speed lifting millions out of poverty. Pragmatically speaking, much of the SDT relief for China has already expired: long transition periods on many agreements are over and China has become a provider, rather than a receiver, of technical assistance. In short, on the narrow matter of legal rights and obligations the practical implications of Beijing’s renunciation are likely modest if not negligible.

Where the announcement does matter is politics – and the WTO is steeped in politics, while facing attack from multiple fronts. For external critics around the world, China’s willingness to relinquish SDT can be presented as a willingness to play by the commonly agreed rules. For Beijing, the timing is deliberate. The United States (US) has in recent years pushed harder to treat China as a strategic competitor and has sometimes sought to deny China the privileges that come with developing‑country treatment. By voluntarily shedding SDT, China takes that argument away: “We’re not hiding behind the ‘developing country’ status anymore,” the message runs, “we will accept equal treatment.” That is a diplomatic gambit with both defensive and offensive payoffs.

It defuses a frequent line of critique. Accusations that China unfairly exploits its “developing” label to avoid obligations will become harder to sustain when China itself renounces that status. It creates political capital Beijing can spend in ongoing WTO discussions. If China signals it will not claim flexibilities, other members may be less inclined to block or delay outcomes on development‑sensitive items — from agricultural access to industrial subsidies and plurilateral initiatives — because one major holdout is publicly constrained.

That potential is not theoretical: some WTO dossiers have long been blocked due to the insistence of a few developing countries on differential treatment. South Africa, India and others have used SDT as leverage to preserve policy space — sometimes blocking multilateral progress. China’s move could loosen that deadlock and the result could be incremental progress on issues that matter to global trade governance.

Yet, the limits are important to recognize. Beijing giving up SDT does not automatically translate into improved market access for foreign exporters to China. Tariff peaks in agriculture and non‑agricultural tariffs on certain products are historically rooted in domestic policy choices and in the low base rates that EU and US applied when the WTO was founded. Those differences are structural, not a by‑product of SDT. China’s domestic regulatory environment — from standards and certification to market entry rules and industrial policy favoring domestic champions — will continue to shape access more than formal WTO status. So renouncing SDT is unlikely to turn China overnight into a market that can be regarded as generally open comparable to the EU, for example.

Another angle is geopolitics. The announcement can be read as Beijing seeking to fill an institutional vacuum created by faltering US leadership in the multilateral trade system. By signalling cooperation on trade governance — and by coupling that with outreach to low‑income countries, such as the recent promise of duty‑free access to African imports — China positions itself as a palatable partner for the low-income countries. This has implications beyond the WTO context: it affects soft power, trade diplomacy and the contest for influence in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia.

Europe’s response matters. The EU is confronted with a choice: concede rhetorical space to China’s “cooperative” repositioning or decide to even more proactively assert its own vision of a rules‑based system. If Brussels lets Beijing set the narrative — that China is the responsible multilateralist while others are faltering — Europe risks ceding leverage in future rulemaking on trade.

In short, China’s renunciation of SDT is mostly symbolic in legal terms but consequential politically. It underscores Beijing’s intent to shape the global trade agenda on its terms ahead of the 14^th Ministerial Conference of the WTO in March 2026, to reduce a frequent grievance against it and to court developing countries with new offers of cooperation. For Brussels, the appropriate response is not to reflexively applaud the move, but to engage. The WTO can truly use a credible, ambitious and balanced reform agenda. Whether China’s step helps unlock it depends less on renouncing SDT than on whether other members seize the window of opportunity to move towards this objective.