On Tuesday, June 17, the FfD4 Preparatory Committee approved the Compromiso de Sevilla as outcome document of the FfD4 conference. The agreement came surprisingly early, arriving almost two weeks before the start of the conference in Seville. The document itself is lacking in many respects. However, achieving an agreement supported by all countries except the U.S. is, in the current situation, already an achievement.
An insufficient outcome document
Measured by what is needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030, the document is insufficient. For instance, FfD4 has failed to adopt a truly universal perspective. It remains mainly focused on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in Global South countries, even though global sustainable development is not possible without a fundamental transformation in high income countries as well. In addition, while the document mentions alternative metrics to GDP, it still upholds a development model that relies heavily on global economic growth, despite well-founded doubts about the feasibility of unlimited growth within planetary boundaries.
When examining specific policy areas, the results are, at best, mixed. For instance, the document includes some language on financial market regulations aimed at mobilising sustainable investments. However, the pledge to “give due consideration to the elaboration” of such regulations does not constitute a firm commitment. Efforts to stop the financing of environmentally harmful investments, which seems to be increasing again, are not explicitly mentioned. Furthermore, the document contains hardly any language on reforming the IMF and the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) that is truly committal (implementing reforms in this area without U.S. support would have been extremely difficult anyway). Regarding taxation, the document vaguely supports a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (“We will continue to engage constructively in the negotiations…”). A commitment to transparency and improved oversight of tax expenditures was significantly watered down during the negotiation process. In addition, the persistent myth that a lack of public resources can simply be compensated by mobilising private funds through blended finance instruments is prominent in the document.
Regarding Official Development Assistance (ODA), the document reaffirms the longstanding commitment of many donor countries to allocate 0.7 % of GNI to ODA. While this commitment feels more detached from reality than ever before, its inclusion might still hold some importance. However, concrete reforms related, for example, to the bureaucratic structures of development organisations or a separation of the reporting on poverty reduction related ODA and climate finance related ODA, are not described. Furthermore, the document mentions increased budget support as a possibility, but does not including a concrete commitment in this respect.
Given the limited ambition of the outcome document, it is unrealistic to expect this agreement to put the implementation of the 2030 Agenda back on track. The failure to do so cannot simply be dismissed as unfortunate but inevitable. It translates into enormous suffering for millions of people who remain trapped in poverty, lack basic health care and education, or face severe environmental degradation – suffering that is avoidable in the sense that we collectively have the means to prevent it. We just fail again and again to establish the rules and institutions that would be necessary to do so.
The benefits lie in the process
However, the shortcomings of the outcome document do not make FfD4 a complete disappointment. First, to be disappointed, one would have had to expect something better in the first place. However, the current geopolitical situation, characterised by selfish nationalism and deep international divides, has hardly provided any reason to expect political breakthroughs.
Secondly, the best signal from the FfD process is arguably that the U.S. has remained isolated in its fundamentalist opposition to meaningful international cooperation. Throughout the negotiations, the U.S. repeatedly opposed language on a wide range of issues, including trade, financial market regulation, international debt, tax, or gender equality. It withdrew its support for the 2030 Agenda and denied the FfD process the mandate to address many of the topics on its agenda. To give in to the U.S. demands would have meant stripping the outcome document of any meaningful substance. Thus, adopting the document without U.S. consent was the better option, even though it will make implementation of many commitments very difficult.
In light of its isolation, the U.S. announced its withdrawal from the process in the FfD4 Preparatory Committee meeting on June 17. Immediately after, all other countries approved the document by consensus. The outcome thus demonstrates at least that many countries remain committed to multilateralism, helping to prevent a complete breakdown of international cooperation.
Thirdly, FfD4 has highlighted the benefits of UN processes in which all countries have a voice. In this respect, the contrast with the G7 summit – taking place on the same day the FfD4 outcome document was finalised – could not be more stark. The FfD process has also provided civil society organisations and think tanks the opportunity to contribute, with many organisations from across the globe seizing the chance. The inclusive and the participatory nature of the process should be recognised. The value added by the FfD process therefore lies not only in its outcome document, but also in the exchanges between policy-makers and civil society representatives from around the world that it has enabled.
Despite the insufficient results, the FfD process thus remains important. At the same time, the U.S. behaviour has underscored that ambitious political reforms in the international sphere will only be possible in the future if the rise of nationalist, post-factual policy-making in so many countries can be stopped. Only then can we hope for the cooperative action and collective solutions to global problems that are so urgently need.
This blog post is part of a series on the 4th FfD conference by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Please also read the previous contributions to this series:
- MDBs at FfD4: More Attention, Few Breakthroughs?, by Yabibal Walle
- Towards a stronger shared climate and development finance agenda: what role for the FfD4?, by Svea Koch and Mariya Aleksandrova
- FfD4 Countdown: A Watered-Down Proposal on Tax Expenditures Risks Undermining Countries’ Domestic Revenue Mobilization, by Alexandra Readhead, Agustin Redonda, Christian von Haldenwang, Giovanni Occhiali, and Hazel Granger
- Investment Facilitation for Development: What Should FfD4 Deliver?, by Axel Berger and Zoryana Olekseyuk
- Frozen in time: How to rethink the role of foreign aid in FFD4, by Heiner Janus
- The Group of 77 in the FfD negotiations, by Anna Novoselova
- How Seville Can Sow the Seeds for a New Spring: Financing (Sustainable) Development Must Turn Universal!, by Adolf Kloke-Lesch
- Trump and FfD4 – the Elephant in the Room Starts to Speak (and Destroy), by Sören Hilbrich, Yabibal Walle, and Clara Brandi
- Rationalising Tax Expenditures – a Core Element of Financing for Development, by Christian von Haldenwang and Agustín Redonda
- Forging Consensus: Navigating Trade Controversies in the FfD4 Zero Draft, by Clara Brandi
- Cumbersome but Essential – The United Nations Financing for Development Process Ahead of its 4th Conference, by Kathrin Berensmann, Clara Brandi, Sören Hilbrich, and Yabibal Walle
All blogs express the views of the author(s).
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