Schlagwort: Ukraine

  • “Zeitenwende”: The heat is on!

    “Zeitenwende”: The heat is on!

    Photo: Bright Sun on a landscape Photo by jplenio on Pixabay

    Europe is facing some heat. Literally – with another heat wave grasping the continent – and figuratively with threats to the global order through Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Profound shifts are happening – with political answers too quick for some, and painfully slow when looking at evidence on the ultimate challenge: human-made climate change and its effects. We have seen indicators for disruptive change in the global order before: terrorism (after 2001), a financial crisis (2008), a global pandemic (since 2020), and, after a long build-up, the drastic effects of a climate crisis coming into focus with numerous extreme weather events. This blog is about the future of globalisation, in times of uncertainties and while we find ourselves with multiple challenges in a volatile, if not “reeling global order”. Let’s get to the fundamental then.

    Political reactions to crises created a year of multilateralism in 2015, with the Paris Agreement and the creation of the Agenda 2030. Even through years of backlash, with destructive populist agendas like Brexit, the presidencies of Donald Trump, of Jair Bolsonaro, the global community continued working around political bottlenecks, be that by pledging individual “nationally determined contributions” (too little, according to scientific evidence), be that by establishing informal club-like coordination mechanism like the G20. These formats aimed at short-circuiting blockages in established multilateral global institutions. And yet, they inadvertently also undermined multilateralism, creating excuses for those who did not believe in it in the first place.

    We cannot ignore the (literal and figurative) heat, we need to face it! We do not inevitably relive the at the turn of the last century, when “progress” was disruptive, did away with old certainties and made societies dizzy, as Philipp Blom described it. It’s the 2020s, not the 1900s. Russia’s attack on Ukraine drastically added political momentum for change, destroyed old certainties (or delusions?) about a rules-based global order, as seen in Europe – and brought afore differences in perspective across the globe, where the war is often seen as a European conflict.

    Messy realpolitik – globally

    Global politics is more than the pursuit of self-interests; we are interdependent, living on the same small planet with limited resources. Thus, a rules-based order working towards sustainability is ever more important. At the same time, cooperation is based on interaction – and broad-based personal contacts are disrupted due to a pandemic. Effects on cooperation between societies and economies are illustrated by the continued Zero-COVID-policy in China, for instance, which leads to backlogs before Shanghai harbour and disrupts production lines and value-chains. This creates even more incentives to further loosen transnational connections and disentangle relations. To this contradictory concoction came Russia’s invasion of a neighbouring country.

    Previously, we were certain that Interdependencies have a stabilising effect. We thought that we can tip the scales in favour of “peaceful coexistence” by working on interconnectedness, making a unilateral change of the status quo very costly for all sides. Some actors might be aiming to shift boundaries gradually, trying to bully neighbours over contested territories. Alas, the saying was “we are all in the same boat”. The Russian invasion in the face of global challenges reminded us that while we are on the same ocean, we might be steering different boats. The invasion of Ukraine illustrates that it’s not only the economy, stupid: Russia threw its economic self-interests out of the window and went for an invasion despite high human and economic costs! While this might have been due to miscalculation of reactions to the war by “the West”, we still need numerous other players to bring the message to Moscow that this is an unacceptable violation of the international order.

    We need to understand the various perspectives and motivations of countries: How much do they have to gain or lose from the current setting? How do they navigate global challenges? European politicians engage with counterparts such as Qatar for diversity of gas resources. Morally questionable, and yet necessary. It’s Realpolitik and it’s messy.

    Listening rather than preaching

    We need to be able to make our point – and still hear different, nuanced views. We are dealing with a more diversified world, in which engaging with China is a different matter from engaging with, say, Senegal, Ghana or Tunisia. While China is an economic partner and systemic rival, the latter are equally democratic states, yet with massive social, economic and ecological challenges, different historical experiences and locations, different power potential, which all makes for variations in priorities and sensitivities.

    Many countries are well aware of asymmetries in power, which means that pressure can be exercised more easily in one direction. In its strive to diversify partners, many countries beyond Europe also find themselves in quagmires when trying to diversify relations. Countries and their political actors might not want to alienate any partner. And yet, their perspectives on partners might still be different from the Europeans’. Is China a flawless partner? – No. Would you still rather take a credit from Beijing than not have the infrastructure at all? – Sure.

    Cooperation isn’t about whether partners “love us more”; it is about where we have common interests. Acknowledging that countries define their interests, that these are not necessarily identical to European choices and yet seeking communalities, is a first step in revamping relations. This does not mean that we agree to all arguments; some we will regard as profoundly wrong. But we need to understand the other, which requires listening rather than preaching.

    A principled – and self-critical – Europe needed

    Europe cannot claim to always be the morally superior part in cooperation. Historically, the effects of climate change are due to “the North’s” industrialisation, its exploitation of resources and peoples. This is the rich countries’ responsibilities, notwithstanding that this increasingly includes those who got rich recently by replicating the – unsustainable, fossil-fuel based – European/North American pathway. In fact, Europe over-consumes, under-recycles and uses way more resources than planet Earth has. At global scale, our lifestyle is the problem. In other words: we cannot simply teach, but need to learn with each other and be part of the solution.

    Speaking of responsibilities is not to shun us into guilty silence because of choices of our forefathers. Current generations need to speak (and live up to) values, condemn Russia’s atrocities, and seek to convince others of our perspective. However, we need to overcome complacency, transform and avoid moral hubris!

    Human cooperation is based on trust, and trust is in short supply. Where violence takes over – see Russia’s war, for instance – cooperation becomes impossible. Between Europe and Africa, historical experiences were traumatic on the African side, and have, to a large extent, been fast forgotten or even continue to be glorified by Europeans. Inequalities persist, racism is alive, and injustices within countries also continue to hurt societies. True, many countries have been independent for decades now, and some of their ruling elites have made wrong choices. Yet, the structural stacking of cards by (former) colonial powers persists. In this context, the return of stolen cultural artefacts might be symbolic, but it is one element in allowing for some healing. On the European side, it allows for – and ideally triggers – critically revisiting history. If we ignore historical responsibilities, cooperation has no future. Europe needs to continue engaging in self-critical debates, if it aspires to be(come) credible on its principles.

    More and broader-based cooperation!

    The Russian war on Ukraine questions fundamentals of the global order – ultimately: peaceful coexistence and sovereignty. To be clear: Military action is unacceptable, requires a firm answer to the aggressor, and we should certainly engage with third countries to clarify and promote our approach. The new setting should, however, not make us slip into a “with-or-against-us”-mentality towards those who do not fully share our perspectives. We might need to take a step back and discuss the fundamentals again, as Alexander Stubb suggested. And thereby discuss the future of global governance, and cooperation.

    While the war seems to have revived “the West” as an entity for closer coordination, the discussion clearly has to be broader and more inclusive. We need to engage for the sake of our common future! This will certainly not exclude rivalry between different political systems and core values if practiced as a competition of ideas. Aggressive denial by some does not wipe out scientific evidence, and it cannot take efforts hostage to strive for more sustainability, if we are serious in our interest to survive as a species. Global challenges persist and we need to continue cooperation for the benefit, if not simply: the survival, of all – despite different world views.

  • The war in Ukraine: financial, political and credibility challenges for EU-Africa cooperation on peace and security

    Photo: Flags of African Union and European Union on the Paul Kagame AU-EU Summit | Brussels, 18 February 2022

    On 24 February, Russia invaded Ukraine. The invasion prompted a strong reaction from the EU in a manner and speed that few had anticipated. Just a week prior, the EU summit with the African Union convened 40 African heads of state and government and 27 of their European colleagues. As the global setting for EU security policy has dramatically changed within a few weeks, the war in Ukraine will also have important implications for EU-Africa cooperation on peace and security.

    Former Finnish prime minister Alexander Stubb remarked on social media that he had “never seen the EU acting with more determination, speed and unity.” In a similar fashion, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Borrell called the EU’s response to the war the ‘geopolitical awakening of the EU’, while Commission President von der Leyen described it as a ‘watershed moment’ in the history of the Union.

    Within the span of twenty days, we have indeed witnessed EU unity and action, covering the full range from expressions of solidarity to strong sanctions. The actions taken also involved leaving behind old taboos: the Union decided to use the European Peace Facility (EPF) to procure and distribute lethal military equipment to Ukraine. This is the first time ever the EU provides weapons to another country, with a first €500 million agreed on 28 February and EU foreign ministers reaching political agreement to an additional EPF contribution of the same size during their meeting on 21 March.

    Ramifications beyond Ukraine

    Significant questions remain both on if and how the AU and EU may jointly respond to the conflict, and how their cooperation on peace and security will be affected – both intentionally and unintentionally – by the war in Ukraine.

    Supporting peace and security in Africa has been a key priority of the EU’s foreign and security policy since the first Africa-EU summit in 2000. The EU has currently deployed eleven military operations and civilian missions under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to African conflict contexts. These include two maritime operations at the Horn of Africa and the Mediterranean, four military training missions deployed in Mali, Somalia, Central African Republic, and Mozambique, and five civilian missions in Libya, Central African Republic, Somalia, Mali and Niger. Recent months have shown some tensions between the EU’s engagement and the involvement of Russian private military corporation Wagner as requested by some of these states.

    European funding for African security efforts

    In addition to its own military and civilian missions, the EU has made important and predominantly financial contributions to the long-term strengthening of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Under the motto „African solutions to African problems,“ the EU has since 2004 provided nearly €3 billion under the African Peace Facility (APF) for AU-mandated African peace support operations, capacity building of APSA structures, and short-term crisis prevention and peace mediation. A substantial portion of the APF funds were dedicated to the African Union peacekeeping mission AMISOM in Somalia.

    On 21 March 2021, around a year ago, EU foreign ministers agreed to create a European Peace Facility that replaced the APF. This was part of a larger reform in the EU’s legal basis for the financing of its external action, specifically the integration of the European Development Fund through which the APF was funded into the EU’s general budget. By remaining outside the EU’s budget as an intergovernmental fund, the EPF can finance assistance measures to support the military aspects of peace support operations led by a regional or international organisation. In addition, the EPF can also fund the provision of lethal military equipment to partner countries’ armed forces, which was not possible through the APF. To pursue these objectives, the EPF was equipped with a financial ceiling of €5.692 billion in current prices (€5 billion in 2018 prices) for the period 2021-2027, with an annual ceiling that increases from €420 million in 2021 to €1.132 billion in 2027. While the EPF will also provide financial support to peace operations in Africa in the same way the APF has, it does not require an AU mandate to do so. Moreover, the ‘demand-driven’ nature of the EPF means that no funds are earmarked or otherwise reserved for countries or regions, including Africa.

    An ambitious agenda for EU-Africa cooperation

    In view of this track record, the February summit in Brussels provided the first occasion for a political ‚continent-to-continent‘ dialogue on peace and security since the previous Abidjan Summit of December 2017. The resulting outcome document did not include very specific statements on next steps, but confirmed key thematic areas for future cooperation. These commitments include the strengthening of cooperation in the area of military capacity building and the provision of training and equipment, the continued support of African-led peace support operations and a stronger integration with EU military and civilian missions as well as enhanced cooperation on cybersecurity. The text also includes a general commitment to intensify cooperation in the field of civilian crisis prevention, but overall there is clear focus on intensifying military-related domains of cooperation.

    The invasion of Ukraine: three implications for EU-Africa relations

    The war in Ukraine already challenges the realisation of the peace and security agenda agreed at the AU-EU summit, with the EU facing its financial implications for the EPF, the political implications for the EU member states, and the credibility related to the design and added value of the EPF.

    Financial implications. With an annual ceiling of €540 million for 2022, the two assistance measures for Ukraine adopted on 28 February worth €500 million already account for 90 percent of the planned budget for 2022. On 21 March, foreign affairs ministers reached a political agreement on an additional €500 million to be mobilised under the EPF, which will necessitate re-negotiations of the EPF annual ceilings. But it will also require member states to have a more strategic discussion about how the assistance to Ukraine affects (planned) EPF engagements in other countries and regions. An open dialogue with the African Union about what the war in Ukraine and the EPF expenses means for the implementation of the priorities agreed at the AU-EU summit is warranted, as well as for the planned and continued EU financial contributions to African peace operations through the EPF.

    Political implications. The immediate focus of European foreign and security policy will be on Eastern Europe. The measures adopted at the EU level to provide military and economic support to Ukraine, the strengthening of NATO’s military presence in the Baltic and Eastern European states, and the bilateral support provided to Ukraine by many European states demonstrate this shift of priorities. It may also lead EU member states to put a stronger focus on tasks of territorial and collective defence, which may decrease their willingness to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions abroad. The EU’s engagement in the Sahel could be seriously affected, as the Ukraine war may make EU-wide debates about how to compensate for the French military withdrawal from Mali even more complex. Again, this may lead to a (partial) winding down of the EU’s military presence in Africa, the implications of which are hard to predict at this point. At least it is clear that the EU will need to seriously engage with its African partners to ensure that any decisions on withdrawals or adjustments are well coordinated with them.

    Credibility challenges. The use of the European Peace Facility in Ukraine to provide lethal equipment to a country facing a full-scale military invasion by another country along the EU’s external borders is a dramatically new situation. Assistance measures were primarily intended to support military capacity building and train and equip efforts of the EU in partner countries that face armed conflict within their territory and that need long-term support in strengthening their security forces.

    Given the urgency of the situation in Ukraine, it is hard to imagine that the EU could follow its integrated methodological framework for EPF assistance measures. As per this framework, the EU would be required to conduct rigorous conflict risk analyses and impact assessments for the first-ever provision of lethal equipment to a third country. Their relevance notwithstanding, the EU officials who negotiated the legal basis of the EPF may not have anticipated the use of the instrument in an ongoing war where monitoring and evaluating the measures would however be close to impossible. The current situation in Ukraine indeed makes it impossible for the EU to send in personnel to monitor how the equipment was used and if compliance rules have been followed. In view of the exceptional nature of the situation under which the assistance measures for Ukraine were adopted, the EU should ensure that the decisions made are well-communicated, well-understood and accepted by its African partners.

    The need for dialogue

    Communicating the exceptional nature of this war along the EU’s borders – and the pressure it puts on its new European Peace Facility – should be the starting point of the AU-EU dialogue on peace and security, as opposed to an impediment to it. Many African states chose not to support the recent UN General Assembly resolution on Ukraine, which shows that this dialogue will not always be easy. Yet, it is also a crucial case where both continents are challenged to show that their commitment to international cooperation goes beyond the words expressed in their summit document. To this end, the EU needs to engage in serious and open dialogue with African partners on the possible implications of the Ukraine war for EU-Africa cooperation and to identify possible areas for cooperation and a joint response.

  • UN General Assembly voting on Ukraine – What does it tell us about African states’ relations with external partners?

    Photo: Logo of the UN on blue ground
    Picture by Chickenonline on Pixabay

    On 2 March 2022, the UN General Assembly voted in a special emergency session on a resolution condemning the Russian attack on Ukraine. The General Assembly dealt with the issue on the basis of a referral from the Security Council, which was paralysed by a Russian veto. The resolution calls for an immediate ceasefire and clearly names Russia as the aggressor. (mehr …)