Blog Header: Sustainable Futures. Debates to shape a collaborative multipolar world
  • Successfully „holding the line“- the EU and the outcomes of COP 28

    Successfully „holding the line“- the EU and the outcomes of COP 28

    Photo: Group Photo on the stage of the Climate Change Conference of the Parties 2023 (COP28) in Dubai © European Union / David Martin, Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/cor-photos/53379323878/in/album-72177720313008202/

    When Sultan Al-Jaber, the United Emirates of Arabia President of COP28, finally presented an amended text for adoption in the closing plenary, the EU seemed relieved: For the first time in 30 years of climate negotiations, the decision now explicitly addressed fossil fuels. At last years “COP27” UN climate change conference, the EU took many by surprise with a gamble it appeared to have taken. Europe conceded to developing countries’ demands with regard to establishing a designated funding mechanism to deal with loss and damage resulting from climate change literally in an overnight turnaround. It had expected to yield returns with regard to mitigation ambition, yet, these did not materialize at COP27. Following the establishment of the Transitional Committee there was no way back for the EU in the run up to COP28. Indeed, the EU now needed to be seen to walk the talk and deliver on loss and damage finance, which in fact it has done. Still, return on investment, if you will, remained uncertain until the very last hours of extra-time at this year’s COP28.

    As a top priority for COP28, the EU’s aim was to land a deal on the „phase-out“ of fossil fuels and the „phase-in“ of renewable energy. While the final decision falls short of the desired wording on fossil-fuel phase out, it does introduce the „transitioning away from fossil fuels“, which signifies nothing less but a game changer. Moreover, the decision includes the tripling of renewable energy and doubling of energy efficiency by 2030 as initiated by the EU ahead of COP28. This led EU Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra to conclude that: “The world just adopted a historic decision at COP 28 to set in motion an irreversible, accelerated transition away from fossil fuels. With that, we have achieved what we set out to do: keep 1.5 within reach and mark the beginning of the end of fossil fuels“.

    While it is hard to assess the EU’s specific role in securing this outcome, it is fair to appraise its consistency in „holding the line“- a metaphor used by civil society organisations to refer to the need to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as stipulated in the Paris Agreement. The EU’s Green Deal and its domestic climate law which entails a reduction of CO2 emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels underpinned European delegates with the necessary self-confidence to do so and to present itself once more as a global leader on climate policy. Moreover, the EU can claim to be the world’s largest provider of climate finance for developing countries – an achievement that shines all the brighter in the glaring contrast to the US, among others, who have been failing to contribute their fair share for a long time. Accordingly, Teresa Ribeira, the Spanish environment minister who led the EU Delegation on behalf of the Spanish Presidency, as well as a host of EU representatives including German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, could authentically threaten to not accept a COP outcome that would be way below the EU’s expectations. It also made the EU a credible partner for the so-called “High Ambition Coalition” (HAC) of countries, prominently including the Alliance of Small Island States among others, which insisted on fossil-fuel phase out. It is here, arguably, that the EU’s upfront investment on Loss and Damage eventually payed off. On balance, the EU did everything that was needed to „hold the line“ of including fossil fuel language into the final decision as a means to keep 1.5 degrees within reach.

    This was no mean feat – as was evidenced by the fierce negotiations throughout the two weeks of COP28. While in the past, the EU has often struggled to present a united position in UN climate change negotiations, it came to Dubai well-prepared and with an ambitious negotiating mandate. Throughout COP 28, the EU managed to stand and act together – most notably when the UAE Presidency presented a draft final text for the first Global Stocktake that many parties – including the EU – considered inadequate. Unambiguously and jointly stating that the EU was not willing to accept this outcome, it kept engaging in particular through the High-Ambition Coalition to secure a substantially improved deal.

    Yet, there is little reason for exuberance. The real-world impact of the unprecedented, but lukewarm language on fossil fuels remains to be seen. And there remain a number of unresolved issues and unfinished business that are hardly less important in comprehensively meeting the objectives of the Paris Agreement, not least with regard to adapting to climate change consequences that can no longer be avoided.

    With regards to adaptation, the EU in Dubai failed to send strong signals of solidarity with the most vulnerable countries. The EU did not stand up strongly for an ambitious Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and the establishment of a framework that can guide nations in their efforts to adapt to climate change and promote climate-resilient development. While the GGA has formally been adopted in Dubai, it falls disappointingly short of quantifiable financial targets and a clear recognition of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities. Here, the EU chose to side with other wealthy countries, most notably the US, in not supporting more ambitious outcomes, mainly referring to the existing goal of doubling adaptation finance and the upcoming process of defining a new collective quantified goal (NCQG).

    The EU will need to step up its game ahead of COP 29 in Azerbaijan. While rightly pointing to the large shares of climate finance it provides, the EU failed to act convincingly as “Team Europe” at the COP stage in this respect. At the start of COP 28, the COP Presidency landed two coups: a swift adoption of the agenda and the adoption of the framework of the new loss and damage fund. Together with Germany, it also presented the first pledges of 100 million each to the fund, hoping to unlock other countries’ contributions. During this opening plenary, other European governments came in -notably France, Italy and Denmark- to announce their bilateral contributions. Very good – and yet, the spokesperson for the Spanish Presidency was left to sum up these contributions and present them as a „Team Europe“. Imagine if the EU had opened the COP with a joint pledge of almost half a billion! That would have been a truly strong European signal and could be an important lesson for future EU announcements on adaptation and the NCQG.

    Moreover, the decision on transitioning from fossil fuels is not supported by a package of support for developing countries to decarbonise their economies and to invest in renewables. While this weak support for so-called means of implementation is not only the EU’s fault, it also did not demonstrate leadership in this respect. In particular with regard to the Just Transition Work Programme, there remains a clear divide between the G77+ and rich countries, with the former advocating for more far-reaching visions of just transition (to address all of society, economy, justice and equity) and wealthy countries merely calling for social dialogue and stakeholder participation around Just Transitions.

    In addition, when deciding on its own position in the process to define the new finance goal by then end of 2024 (the NCQG) the EU needs to be aware of the expectations of developing countries (represented as the G77 plus China in the UNFCCC). In Dubai, the EU used every opportunity to refer to the need to make all financial flows consistent with climate change and by this mainly refers to the alignment of private capital towards climate action. This is reasonable, knowing how difficult it will be for many member states to provide significantly larger amounts as public climate finance. Yet, the EU’s stance risks a rift with the G77 and China which has already stated in Dubai that it would not support such a position, referring to the provisions under the Paris Agreement that requires developed countries to assist developing countries to address mitigation and adaptation. Add this to the EU’s position to extend the contributor base of climate finance (indirectly pointing at China and other emerging economies) and you know how far positions are still apart.

    Finally, the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) continues to stir controversies. Following Brazil’s request on behalf of the so-called BASIC group of countries (Brazil, China, India and South Africa), COP28 adopted an agenda item on “Concerns with unilateral trade measures related to Climate Change “, obviously targeting CBAM. The EU repeatedly stated CBAM was not coming up as an issue in the negotiating rooms, but will rather be dealt with under the WTO. However, it is clear that developing countries affected by CBAM expect greater financial and technical support packages from the EU to adapt.

    Brief, the EU needs to brace itself for COP29 – complacency is never a good adviser. The Union needs to further ‚capitalize‘ on the investments it has been making, and to build on the (renewed) trust it has been generating in the context of the High-Ambition Coaliton: clear support for means of implementation and new and additional sources of funding, an ambitious collectively quantified goal with public finance at its core and much stronger support for adaptation ahead of the new round of enhanced Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) that are due in 2025.

  • From dialogue to action: Key lessons from the Consultations on the World Bank Reform Process

    From dialogue to action: Key lessons from the Consultations on the World Bank Reform Process

    Photo: Front of the World Bank Group with their name written on it.
    ©Jonathan Cutrer/Flickr https://www.flickr.com/photos/joncutrer/48856177767

    The World Bank’s current reform efforts are approaching a critical point during the Annual Meetings in Marrakech, Morocco, from October 9 to 15, 2023. The Bank should use this moment to adopt meaningful changes that enable it to tackle the twin challenges of global development and climate change and reflect voices of stakeholders from around the world. The recent consultations conducted by the World Bank, including the regional ones conducted in Africa in July, represent a significant step forward. But they also spotlight crucial issues that demand an unwavering attention by all stakeholders.

    During these consultations, the World Bank gathered input from a wide range of stakeholders from the Global South, including civil society, academia, foundations, think tanks, the private sector, and other development partners. It is imperative for the upcoming Annual Meetings to ensure the integration of critical insights derived from these consultations into the final reform document.

    The report of the World Bank‘s Development Committee (DC) unveiled during the Spring Meetings in April represents a substantial improvement over the previous Evolution Roadmap and had already addressed some of the serious concerns voiced during the consultations. Notably, the DC’s report unequivocally underscores that the Bank’s enhanced mission must be accompanied by an increase in its financial capacity,  although the concrete measures proposed still fall far short of the substantial firepower required for the expanded mission. Moreover, the DC’s report also reiterates that addressing the challenges of climate change should not come at the expense of poverty reduction. Additionally, the previous shift of focus from low-income countries (LICs) toward middle-income countries (MICs), a notable feature of the Evolution Roadmap, has significantly diminished in the DC’s report. The World Bank’s proposed mission “to end extreme poverty and boost shared prosperity by fostering sustainable, resilient, and inclusive development” also puts reducing inequality and fostering inclusion –two key demands from the consultations –at its core.

    It is imperative to underscore that the effective execution of these commitments is inextricably linked to the Bank’s capacity to augment its lending prowess. Therefore, shareholders must promptly undertake resolute measures to bolster the Bank’s financial strength. In this context, the announcement by Chancellor Olaf Scholz that his government would invest in hybrid capital is an important step in the right direction. This investment can unlock up to $2 billion in additional lending capacity. Looking ahead, this has the potential to significantly boost the World Bank’s lending capacity, particularly if the German government engages in diplomatic efforts to persuade other stakeholders to do the same. In addition to the aforementioned concerns, these consultations have highlighted crucial issues that merit the World Bank’s focus at the upcoming Annual Meetings, and by gauging their frequency of mention, we have pinpointed three pivotal areas that should be integrated into a revised World Bank reform document.

    1. Fighting Corruption and Strengthening Governance: The persistent challenges of poor governance and widespread corruption in LICs and MICs continue to hinder progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Participants in the Bank’s consultations have rightly called upon the institution to prioritise combating corruption as a cross-cutting issue in all interactions with national governments. Some suggest making participation in initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Open Government Partnership (OGP) mandatory for borrowing countries. As the World Bank seeks to increase its financing capacity, it should advocate for greater transparency in recipient countries to ensure that increased funding does not lead to increased corruption. Linking lending criteria to transparency and striving to be a model of procurement and procedural transparency are crucial steps forward.
    2. Strengthening Engagement with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs): the World Bank should engage and support CSOs as critical advocates for transparency and accountability. While acknowledging that CSOs were well-represented in the consultations, there is a concern that the institution may be disengaging them. With governments as the primary clients of the WBG, the involvement of CSOs is crucial to ensuring the transparency and impact of projects.
    3. Focusing on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs): Participants generally welcomed the World Bank’s enhanced focus on leveraging private capital. However, it is vital to ensure that SMEs, which drive economic growth and job creation in LICs and MICs, are not overlooked in this new orientation. The Bank must actively address the concerns raised by some participants who fear that SMEs may lose out to larger corporations.

    In sum, the World Bank’s ongoing reform process is commendable for providing a platform for multiple voices from around the world, including from African countries. The concerns from around the world must be met with a strong commitment to proactively combat corruption, improve governance, engage CSOs and support SMEs. In addition, the Bank’s financing capacity needs to be strengthened through capital increases from shareholders and through other bold changes that better leverage the Bank’s balance sheet to unlock additional financial resources. The German government can play a key role by trying to convince other stakeholders to join in investing in hybrid capital as a way to mobilise additional resources for sustainable development.

  • The BRICS bang! – Signals from BRICS enlargement to South, West and North

    The BRICS group – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – invite six countries to join them for a BRICS+. The final list of invitees is an odd bunch: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran from the Middle East, Argentina from Latin America and Egypt and Ethiopia from Africa, with the former also being an Arab state. This decision on specific members came after apparently tough discussions amongst current membership, as interests varied widely. Yet, the return of geopolitics seems to have revitalised a disparate group. Why (only) these six, what are likely effects on international relations, and who’s benefitting most?

    (mehr …)

  • Open Science: A role for the G20 to materialise its global potential?

    Open Science: A role for the G20 to materialise its global potential?

    Photo: Data and graph on a screen, Symbol for open science and dfigitalization Photo by Pexels on Pixabay

    Knowledge cooperation—specifically science cooperation—is a precondition of coordinated efforts for combatting global crises from climate to finance, and from food to public health. Cloud server storage and satellite-based internet connectivity are key technologies to reducing to zero the time and distance necessary to exchange knowledge across the planet. Science could be an effective means of international cooperation towards combatting global crises, but knowledge is currently not shared freely. Consequently, calls for scientific knowledge to be freely accessible and open to participation by everyone are ever more present.

    “Open Science”, the term under which the discussion is led, comes with enormous potential to address global challenges such as climate change or pandemics. It has been embraced by international organisations and major science associations around the world. Most recently, in February 2023, the UN’s 3rd Open Science conference, uniting UN bodies with international science institutions and associations made a clear statement: Open Science is necessary for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, and further, it is an instigator of positive digitalisation in the combat against global crises. Despite these promises, its implementation remains limited. The current science paradigm, political will, technical limitations, and a narrow understanding of the concept constitute key obstacles. Following our previous calls for Open Science action, we identify that G20 countries can build upon initiatives by UNESCO and the EU to implement Open Science and materialise its impact soon.

    The Open Science concept benefits from technological advances, as it calls for scientific knowledge to be freely accessible and open to participation by everyone. Its most popular tenets are Open Access, Open Data, and Open Source software, which seek to make publications, data and software code as findable, accessible, interoperable and reusable (FAIR) as possible. The practice of public participation and collaboration in research (citizen science), incorporation of indigenous knowledge, open educational resources, open notebooks, preprints and transparent peer review processes are all aspects of Open Science too.

    The current science paradigm

    A main obstacle to the full implementation of the Open Science objectives is the current science paradigm, which enforces stratified and hierarchical access to scientific knowledge by creating barriers between citizens and the channels through which knowledge is accessed. Many of those barriers are capital and affiliation-based, with most scientific publications locked behind paywalls, including Article Processing Charges (APCs). The UNESCO Science Report 2021 notes that “five commercial publishers are responsible for more than 50% of all published articles and about 70% of scientific publications are still unavailable in open access.” Other ‘rights to access’ are restricted by intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes, in which private companies and individuals have ownership over the data and production of scientific research. In the name of innovation and economic incentives, IPR are vociferously protected by commercially-driven governance regimes, including private sector lobbyists. The production of COVID-19 vaccines provides an illustrative example of how privatising innovation can conflict with the global common good.

    In its Recommendation on Open Science, published in November 2021, UNESCO called for policy implementation at the national and regional levels in order to transform the way that science is conducted and thought about in each UN member state. The Recommendation called for a paradigm shift away from the institutionalisation of science as a tool for profit (or war), and towards the tenet of Article 27 of the Declaration on Human Rights, which defines science as a public good for the common good.

    Digital technologies are key instruments for implementing a global Open Science platform, as most scientific knowledge is shared via the internet. However, ubiquitous and open access to scientific knowledge requires that each person has access to the internet, the digital tools which provide the access, and the skills to navigate the online world (digital literacy). Digital technologies are not only an adult tool—they enter the hands of the youngest generations. This means that digital literacy education needs to integrated alongside of ‘traditional’ literacy education of reading and writing.  Therefore, the UNESCO Recommendation declares that governments and international institutions need to invest public finances in education, science and digital infrastructure. These public investments are intended to make a clear statement that the right to science and access to the internet are fundamental human rights; they are essential for inclusion and equality, for economic growth and cooperation, for an informed and democratic citizenry, and for connecting humanity to a global pool of knowledge for social advancement and combatting global crises.

    Open Research Europe

    Graph: Pillars of Open Science, Virtual and Physical. 1. Open Science Infrastructures, Open engagement of societal actors, Open dialogue with other knowledge systems, Open scientific knowledge.
    ©UNESCO, CC BY-SA 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

    Despite remaining problems of connectivity and access, and the tenacity of the “closed” science paradigm, Open Science is gaining traction. The European Commission’s Open Research Europe platform is a model for implementing Open Science policies cross-nationally. Open Research Europe is the European Union’s one-stop-shop for its Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe research funding programmes. It is not only a repository for publications and their datasets, like Zenodo, but it is also a collection of journals, a transparent peer review platform, and a publishing house all in one platform. Metadata from all uploaded materials is organised in an index which makes preprints, publications and datasets as FAIR as possible. Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe research is publicly funded; and whereas Horizon 2020 piloted Open Science policies in an optional Open Research Data Pilot (ORDP), Horizon Europe mandates Open Science policies in the grants that it awards.

    Open Research Europe is primarily a European initiative, and it comes with a global dimension. The EU’s research programmes, such as the Marie Skłodowska Curie Action (MSCA) incentivise scientific partnerships between European research institutions and global partners. Such endeavours can practically promote the practice of Open Science. To illustrate with an example from our institute, the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) and Instituto Mora, one of Mexico’s leading research institutions, co-coordinate the MSCA-RISE project, Promoting Research on Digitalisation in Emerging Powers and Europe Towards Sustainable Development. It is an example of the power of network cooperation in the nascency of the European Commission’s Open Science model, and also a case for understanding the barriers and differentiated implementation of Open Science policies per region.

    Whereas Open Research Europe can be understood as a model and part of the solution, it is limited to the research conducted under the European Union’s public financing regime.  This regime (Horizon 2020, Horizon Europe, etc.) is, not exclusively but, predominantly focused on research by European institutions. We need an ‘Open Research Global’ approach, which not only takes on the roles of being a host of journals, a publishing house, a data repository and a knowledge index, but also acts as a research and innovation investment instrument that incentivises cross-border flows of knowledge and knowledge cooperation in all dimensions. UNESCO is uniquely situated to spearhead an Open Research Global platform. UNESCO cannot pass a policy for the creation of a global and equitable digital infrastructure, but it can establish scientific partnerships between public and private research institutes which incentivize the construction of an adequate digital infrastructure intra- and internationally.

    What can the G20 do?

    Here the Group of 20 can make a significant contribution. According to a 2020 report from Clarivate’s Institute for Scientific Information, G20 countries accounted for 86% of global research papers in the Web of Science index in 2019. This position comes with the power to promote a global science community in line with the Open Science ideals. The G20 should therefore support initiatives spearheaded by UNESCO and other relevant international bodies in establishing an Open Research Global platform, for sharing scientific knowledge globally and increasing international and economic cooperation. The group could answer the call of the S20 (Science outreach group of the G20), which led up to the last G20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia in 2022, that “G20 governments [should] strengthen the nexus between data, research, policy and practice” by making long term investments in scientific research and open science infrastructures. On this basis, the G20 could employ the Open Science concept for achieving the mandates of the UN 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development by including more voices (and eyes and ears) in science, technology and sustainable development discourses.

    When rolling-out Open Science globally with the support of the G20, policy-makers will have to address concerns that are already on the G20 agenda, such as free flow of data, data localisation, and privacy concerns. In an Open Research Global instrument data and research results would be centralised in a global repository and indexed to be accessed in a FAIR manner, while also requiring that the research be stored locally in interconnected national or regional repositories and indexes. Open Research Global could follow data storage models, such as the International Nucleotide Sequence Database Collaboration (INSDC), which exchanges and keeps copies of data between regional servers. This protects the free flow of data in case of an uptick in data nationalism in one nation or region.

    A digital Open Science with a focus on sustainable development would mitigate concerns of constricting a nation’s ability to prosper from the data its institutions produce and reinforce the sentiment that knowledge is to be shared, openly and equally. To illustrate, a G20-supported Open Research Global approach could advocate for community building projects. Citizen science and indigenous knowledge could be brought into the mainstream science discourse, creating pathways for schools and coding communities to access and develop open educational resources and open source software. The values and skills of digital citizenship and digital literacy could be embedded into primary and secondary school education. The sustainability orientation could thus promote science as an enterprise through which we all participate, shaping our world towards the solutions for common challenges.

    Governments across the world, politically supported by the G20 and in line with the recommendations by international organisations such as UNESCO, need to invest in digital infrastructure, science and education. Reliable internet connections must be thought of as basic, essential infrastructure for enhancing science, education and community building, and for growing the economy. Science must become a public good, open to participation by all citizens in all places. Laws concerning for-profit knowledge protectionism, such as IPR regimes, need to be rewritten so that innovation is fostered by scientific knowledge with a high public impact. Open Science is a concept that should serve as a guiding star to materialise the full potential of inclusive, globally shared knowledge.


    This blog is published jointly with the blog Digitalización Inclusiva, hosted by Instituto Mora, related to the PRODIGEES project.Logo: Funded by the European Union

  • Japan’s climate coalition? – Tokyo’s green chequebook diplomacy campaign is gathering momentum

    Japan’s climate coalition? – Tokyo’s green chequebook diplomacy campaign is gathering momentum

    Photo: Landscape
    By Kanenori on Pixabay

    Addressing a Davos audience last year, in January 2022, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida publicly declared his vision for an Asia Zero Emissions Community (AZEC). Under Tokyo’s leadership, Kishida said, AZEC would drive regional cooperation and joint financing on renewable energy technologies and infrastructure, standardisation, and an emissions trading zone.

    A year on, Prime Minister Kishida and Japan’s Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Yasutoshi Nishimura, have now laid much of the necessary diplomatic groundwork for a more concrete set of initiatives. Tokyo has successfully secured buy-in to the concept from a range of partners, including Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Australia.

    AZEC should be viewed in the broader context of geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific. In line with this, Kishida has acknowledged that he does not expect China to join. The AZEC in large part seeks to build a narrative around Japan’s existing Asia Energy Transition Initiative (AETI), which was initially viewed by some as thin on detail. The narrative includes five core pillars of collaborative action: support for the creation of national energy transition roadmaps in partner states, transition finance presentation and promotion, $10 billion in direct funding for renewables and other energy projects, the development and dissemination of new green technologies, and training programs for those tasked with operating them.

    On the sidelines of last November’s G20 summit in Bali, AZEC’s first major deal was unveiled between Japan and Indonesia. Japan’s state-owned corporation Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI) agreed to insure up to $500 million of loans for Indonesian electric utility company PLN to accelerate its green energy transition. And the state-owned Japan Bank for International Cooperation signed an additional pact to facilitate further collaboration between PLN and Japanese corporations.

    To drive further momentum, Japan has invited energy ministers and business delegations from partner states to Tokyo in early March for two days of discussion on AZEC proposals. Progress made on further deals here will likely give a better sense of the true scale and shape of Tokyo’s ambitions.

    Green chequebook diplomacy?

    AZEC has been linked with Japan’s top-level strategic concept of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Japan has a long history leading on aid, trade, and investment in Southeast Asia that dates back to the Cold War era. As the US moves to establish new military bases in the Philippines to counter China, Japanese leadership across Southeast Asia remains predominantly economic. In part, these dynamics echo Japan’s much maligned ‘chequebook diplomacy’ – most closely associated with Tokyo’s foreign policy in the early 1990s. Japan contributed $13 billion to the first Gulf War in 1991, yet received little in the way of international recognition and faced criticism for not committing troops. We argue that Japan should be optimistic about the potential of this new green chequebook diplomacy, as it holds three key advantages over its 1990s forerunner.

    First, substantial investment in the region’s clean energy transition is likely to be recognised and rewarded by a range of actors at the regional and global level. Indo-Pacific states at the sharp end of the climate crisis have much at stake, and AZEC will be supported by close geostrategic partners like Australia that are similarly concerned about providing alternatives to Chinese investment.

    Second, Japan’s new green chequebook diplomacy works in tandem with a greater regional role for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The SDF are involved in an increasing number of joint exercises in the region, and defence budgets continue to rise. So while economic measures may be Japan’s preferred tool in the region, it is not shying away from deploying military assets either.

    Third, green chequebook diplomacy is more likely than its forerunner to result in mutual economic benefits instead of one-way transfers. A clear part of Japan’s strategic thinking about green energy cooperation is how to drive growth in its domestic green energy industries.

    Challenges

    At the same time, Japan must overcome challenges if it is to maximise returns on its new strategic concept. Most urgently, Japan needs to match the vision of the AZEC with bolder domestic action to reduce its own emissions. Tokyo’s plan to refit current coal-fired power stations to burn ammonia has been labelled a ‘false solution’ by those who claim it will only prolong the use of coal. And at COP27 in 2022 Japan was awarded the inaugural ‘fossil of the day award’ by activists for climate inaction. If Tokyo is to shake off accusations that AZEC is more an industrial strategy than a genuine attempt to combat the climate crisis, then bolder action is needed to transform Japan’s image from climate laggard to leader.

    Meanwhile, Japan’s AZEC concept faces potential competition from other powerful actors that are developing their own varieties of green energy statecraft. China, the US and the EU are among those actively seeking to harness climate diplomacy to pursue their geostrategic aims, and Tokyo faces competition even from its closest partners as they seek to maximise returns on their individual strategies.

    As AZEC’s first scheduled multilateral meeting approaches, though, Japan’s climate diplomacy is gathering momentum and interest – enhancing the prospect of cooperation and mutual benefits in the coming Indo-Pacific clean energy transition.