6. EU engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states: towards a dedicated strategy
Julian Bergmann and Jasmin Lorch
in: Hackenesch, C., Keijzer, N., & Koch, S. (Eds., 2024). The European Union’s global role in a changing world: Challenges and opportunities for the new leadership (IDOS Discussion Paper 11/2024). IDOS.
State of play
State fragility is the new normal of European development policy and a major hurdle for the realisation of the 2030 Agenda. By 2030, an estimated 86% of the world’s extreme poor are projected to live in states marked by fragility, up from 75% in 2020. Already in 2020, 60% of all country allocable official development assistance (ODA) (USD 61.9 billion) disbursed by the OECD-DAC (Development Assistance Committee) went to such states (OECD, 2022, pp. 6, 20). State fragility is thus a key challenge for development policy that the European Union (EU) and other international donors have to deal with.
State fragility denotes deficiencies in one or more of the three core functions of the state: authority (that is, the state’s ability to control physical violence within its territory); capacity (that is, its ability to maintain a functioning administration and deliver social services); and legitimacy (that is, the ability of the state to achieve the consent of the population). Different combinations of deficiencies result in different Constellations of State Fragility (CSF) (IDOS, 2024).
A multi-dimensional analysis of state fragility illustrates an important trend: Rising illiberalism, repression and human rights violations are often interrelated with state fragility. The Arab Spring showed that states in the EU’s neighbourhood, which had looked like bastions of autocratic stability, suffered from such tremendous deficits in legitimacy causing them to quickly destabilise in the wake of policy failures, demonstrations and protest contagion. Some descended into vicious cycles of violent repression, resistance and, ultimately, civil war (IDOS, 2024; Lorch et al., 2024). Accordingly, current EU migration, security and development initiatives in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region (and beyond) face a dilemma as they can strengthen autocratic regimes, potentially promoting state fragility in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood in the long term.
State fragility also offers an important lens for policymakers to improve conflict prevention. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), fragility on the level of both the state and society can spur violent conflict and extra-constitutional takeovers, such as military coups (OECD, 2022, p. 20). Analysing fragility and preventing it from escalating into violent conflict can help prevent human suffering, development failures, and flows of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees.
In many partner countries of the EU, state fragility and conflict are key challenges. With few exceptions such as, for example, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or Venezuela, the EU has multi-annual development cooperation programmes with all of the 60 states that are categorised by the OECD as fragile contexts (OECD, 2022, p. 31). In other words, fragile and conflict-affected states make up more than a third of the EU’s partner countries in total. In addition to the MENA countries, this also includes, for example, the countries in the Sahel region, where state fragility and violent conflict can likewise have direct consequences for the EU regarding security threats and increased migration flows. Since the early 2000s, the EU has developed a distinct approach for its engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states, which builds on a wide array of policy documents and strategies along three distinct, though interlinked, thematic strands (Bergmann & Furness, 2023). First, since the adoption of the 2001 Gothenburg Programme on the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, the EU has further developed its approach to conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding through key strategies and policy documents, such as the 2016 EU Global Strategy, the 2018 Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach, and the 2023 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence.
Second, and more recently, the EU has strengthened its approach to the humanitarian-development-peace nexus (HDP nexus). The Czech Council presidency in 2022 adopted a Presidency Paper on Good Practices on the operationalisation of the HDP nexus, promoting a shared understanding across EU institutions and EU member states (Bergmann & Müller, 2024).
Third, there are two policy documents that define and operationalise the EU’s approach to fragile states: The European Commission’s Communication on Fragile States from 2007, and the 2015 EU Staff Handbook on Operating in Situations of Conflict and Fragility. However, these documents do not reflect recent important geopolitical developments, such as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; increasing geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China; and recent military coups in the Sahel. Moreover, they do not constitute an overarching political strategy for “Team Europe” regarding the topic of state fragility. Relatedly, they focus primarily on the implications of state fragility for Europe, rather than on the prevention of (increased) fragility or on adopting a holistic perspective that goes beyond a security and migration policy-driven approach.
Regarding instruments, the EU possesses a unique budget support tool to strengthen the capacity of fragile states: the State and Resilience Building Contracts (SRBCs). An evaluation of all 42 contracts implemented between 2012 and 2018 has shown that they can be very effective in stabilising or restoring state functions, in particular when it comes to short-term macro-economic and financial stabilisation (European Commission, 2020). However, it will be necessary to better integrate the SRBCs with other conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding interventions to boost their longer-term impact. At the operational level, EU actors have experimented with innovative tools to improve coordination and to impact in fragile states. One example is the creation of HDP Nexus Task Forces in Myanmar or Chad that bring EU and non-EU actors together to advance coordination and joint messaging
Within the context of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI/GE), created in 2021, the EU introduced the joint Conflict Analysis Screening (CAS) tool for 68 conflict-affected and fragile states that the EU cooperates with. Incorporated into the NDICI-GE regulation at the request of the European Parliament, the CAS requires the European External Action Service (EEAS) and all relevant Commission Directorate-Generals to base the multiannual programming for all fragile and conflict-affected states on a joint conflict analysis. However, it remains unclear to what extent EU development policy interventions are consistently based on the prior analysis of conflict factors and the drivers of fragility.
Internal and external influences
The EU’s approach to fragile and conflict-affected states is influenced by both EU-internal and EU-external dynamics.
Where internal dynamics are concerned, the EU’s push for a more interest-driven approach under von der Leyen’s “geopolitical Commission” has led to a marginalisation of state fragility as an important topic for EU development policy. One key initiative reflecting this geopolitical turn is the Global Gateway, under which the EU has launched over 200 so-called flagship initiatives for large infrastructure investments (see Section 1 in this publication). However, the fundamental conditions for such investments – including security, good governance, democratic accountability, and so on – may not be present in fragile and conflict-affected states. Hence, it is questionable whether the Global Gateway is an adequate strategy for the EU to engage in fragile states (Hauck & Desmidt, 2024).
Conversely, if the Global Gateway becomes the new overarching strategy and paradigm for the EU’s international partnerships, the strategic role of EU engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states in which the necessary conditions for sustainable infrastructure investments are not met becomes unclear. Although there seems to be growing awareness that the Global Gateway cannot be the EU’s response to state fragility, the practical implications of this are yet to be spelled out. More generally, there is a risk for the EU in neglecting state fragility due to a narrow focus on non-fragile countries that are more suitable for the Global Gateway flagship projects. This would be problematic, not only because of the humanitarian suffering that often accompanies state fragility but also because the EU’s geopolitical competitors, such as Russia and China, are deepening their engagement in fragile and conflict-affected countries, primarily through military cooperation, as the examples of Mali, Niger, Sudan or South Sudan demonstrate.
As regards external dynamics, the failure of NATO’s military and the associated civilian mission in Afghanistan has led to soul-searching in EU member states about whether, and under what conditions, external measures to build or strengthen state institutions can be successful. The EU’s approach of “Humanitarian Plus” aid, developed for Afghanistan in 2021, potentially signals a move away from ambitious efforts of institution-building towards more short-term approaches centred on humanitarian aid. However, a more thorough engagement with the lessons learned from Afghanistan is required to develop more evidence-based policies for dealing with fragile and conflict-affected states.
External pressures have also emerged in the context of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has laid bare the limits of the EU’s capability to mobilise massive additional funding for crisis response at short notice. In times of austerity, when many EU member states prioritise funding for Ukraine at the expense of other funding needs, the EU’s ability to prevent a rise of state fragility and respond to crises beyond Europe might be at risk. If Donald Trump was re-elected as President of the United States, this could further increase the pressure on the EU to prioritise investing in security in Europe over global partnerships. These trends and scenarios can enhance global instability in the long term and deprive the EU of reliable partners in trade, development, and cooperation for a rules-based international order.
Looking ahead
As argued above, the Global Gateway is not an appropriate strategic framework for the EU’s engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states. Instead, the EU should devise a dedicated strategy to deal with state fragility and conflict and design tailored approaches for its engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states. To capture the complex realities in fragile states, such a strategy should be based on a differentiated, multi-dimensional analytical assessment of state fragility (e.g., Constellations of State Fragility, IDOS, 2024). The strategy should also develop a vision on how to strengthen the EU’s existing set of instruments for engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states, with a particular emphasis on improving the sustainable impact of SRBCs in fragile states. Moreover, the strategy should be geared towards conflict prevention, harnessing the potential of the fragility lens as an early-warning tool. In connection with this, EU policymakers should also maximise synergies between measures to mitigate state fragility and other contributions to the 2030 Agenda.
Controversial discussions on the EU’s engagement in fragile states among EU member states in the first half of 2024, during the Belgian Council Presidency, did not lead to the adoption of Council Conclusions on the EU’s engagement in fragile contexts. This indicates that developing such an EU strategy on fragility may not be easy. However, such a strategy is crucial if the EU is seeking to contribute to international development, crisis prevention, and a more peaceful world.
Several options for the format of such a strategy exist: One is a joint Commission and EEAS communication endorsed by Council Conclusions that sets out key guidelines and principles for the EU’s engagement in fragile states, which member states can then also align with. Another option would be a Compact for EU Engagement in Fragile States developed jointly by EU member states, the Commission, the EEAS, and the European Parliament. Similar to the Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Compact, such a document could include general policy principles, guidelines, and an action plan for improving the EU’s approach towards fragile states regarding coordination, effectiveness and impact. Annual review conferences could ensure that there is a monitoring system to keep track of the implementation, to enable adjustments in the EU’s approach and to provide for a constant re-evaluation of the EU’s engagement in fragile states, where the political conditions for engagement tend to change quickly.
References
Bergmann, J., & Furness, M. (2023). The EU’s approach to fragile states: Conflicting norms, practices, and lessons learnt. In D. Carment & Y. Samy (Eds.), Handbook of fragile states (pp. 369-384). Edward Elgar Publishing.
Bergmann, J., & Müller, P. (2024). Towards an integrated approach to EU foreign policy? Horizontal spillover across the humanitarian-development and the security-migration interfaces. Journal of European Public Policy, 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2024.2368256
European Commission. (2020). Evaluation of EU state building contracts (2012-2018) (Final Report). https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/2c8689dc-ae3f-11ec-83e1-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-266635514
Hauck, V., & Desmidt, S. (2024). The EU risks neglecting fragile and conflict-affected countries (ECDPM Commentary 17 June 2024). ECDPM. https://ecdpm.org/work/eu-risks-neglecting-fragile-conflict-affected-countries
IDOS (German Institute of Development and Sustainability). (2024). Constellations of state fragility. https://idos-research.de/statefragility/
Lorch, J., Ziaja, S., & Grävingholt, J. (2024). Constellations of state fragility: Improving international cooperation through analytical differentiation (Policy Brief 5/2024). IDOS. https://doi.org/10.23661/ipb5.2024
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). (2022). States of fragility (Report). https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/states-of-fragility-2022_c7fedf5e-en.html
