1. The Global Gateway: juggling self-interest, geopolitical competition and developmental aspirations
Niels Keijzer, Svea Koch and Mark Furness
in: Hackenesch, C., Keijzer, N., & Koch, S. (Eds., 2024). The European Union’s global role in a changing world: Challenges and opportunities for the new leadership (IDOS Discussion Paper 11/2024). IDOS.
State of play
Since its announcement in September 2021, the Global Gateway has gradually come to dominate the European Union (EU)’s external action and development policy discourse. First announced to the European Parliament in September 2021 in response to the EU member states’ call for an EU global connectivity strategy, the EU presented its Global Gateway initiative to the world in December 2021. The Global Gateway promises large-scale infrastructure investments in five sectors: digital; climate and energy; transport; health; and education and research. It is designed to promote the EU’s own geo-economic interests, and in particular its energy and overall supply chain diversification and strategic autonomy. The next European Commission is set to take the initiative to the next level by further packaging the investment with trade policy measures and macro-economic support (i.e. budget support) (von der Leyen, 2024).
At the time of its introduction, the initiative sought to reconcile two only partially compatible ambitions:
- Outperforming China and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by increasing the EU’s infrastructure investment – broadly defined – and
- developing a unique and value-driven European approach to providing such investment.
During the past three years, the first ambition was de facto emphasised through the EUR 300 billion investment target that the EU sought to attain in the period 2021-2027, effectively also binding the next EU leadership to deliver on it. The Global Gateway subsequently took a central role in the February 2022 EU-African Union (AU) summit in the form of an EU Investment Package for Africa, as well as in 2023 summits with Asia and with Latin America and the Caribbean.
Notwithstanding subsequent frequent appearances in speeches and summits, the EU’s apparent slow progress towards operationalising the Global Gateway in 2022 became a source of debate and critique. By the end of the year, EU foreign ministers subsequently called for the initiative to be concretised by identifying flagship initiatives covering all relevant regions. In a media appearance in May 2024, the Commissioner for International Partnerships reported that there were at the time a total of 225 Global Gateway flagship projects with a total volume of EUR 100 billion, that is, one-third of the 2030 investment target (Financial Times, 2024). It should be acknowledged that the BRI was first announced in 2013 and also took a considerable time to become more tangible.
The Global Gateway represents one of the EU’s key foreign policy initiatives with major implications for the substantive orientation of European development policy. At the same time, the Global Gateway is still being shaped and defined (“Europe is building the ship while sailing”), leaving ample space for member states to influence its design and impact. It is the ambition of the EU to develop a new type of partnership that delivers tangible benefits to partners and the EU itself. In doing so, the EU faces the challenge of avoiding replicating traditional patterns of cooperation and dependencies with a new label and stronger focus on EU visibility.
In addition, it remains to be determined whether the Global Gateway is in fact a new strategy and narrative for the EU’s development policy, adding to the existing development policy vision, or at least partially eclipsing it. The flexible use of the term “Global Gateway” in the EU’s public discourse also means it is hard to demarcate where the Global Gateway stops and the remainder of the EU’s development policy begins. The Global Gateway appears the relevant and appropriate EU response to global competition, as a key policy through which the EU seeks to demonstrate results and stands up for its values when challenged. Yet in times of increasing multipolarity, new alliance-building and ever stronger geopolitical competition, it remains unclear under which conditions and how the Global Gateway can best promote the EU’s strategic interests and hopes for higher visibility and recognition by its partners. Compared to 2021 when the Global Gateway was first announced, in today’s world such an explicitly EU interest-driven initiative carries an enhanced risk of fuelling conflicts of interest with the Global South. Despite this risk, the political guidelines presented by Commission President von der Leyen on 18 July 2024 as the basis for her second term in office highlighted the necessity for the EU to (continue to) be more assertive in pursuing its strategic interests (von der Leyen, 2024).
Internal and external influences
One objective of the Global Gateway is to be more explicit about the EU’s own economic and strategic interests. At the same time, the EU also seeks to take partner countries’ interests into account and acknowledges that the ownership and interests of its partners are crucial to making it a success. So far, Global Gateway priorities have been decided without consultation with partners. Some alignment of needs and interests may have taken place at the project level, but also here there do not seem to have been standard procedures and processes for determining the 225 flagship projects.
A key next step in further developing the Global Gateway must be to define sectoral strategies for the five different thematic priorities of the Global Gateway, in consultation with partner countries and in respect of their own needs and priorities. Regarding access to raw materials, for instance, the EU has a strong interest in accessing certain raw materials while African countries would like to see support for local industrialisation and value addition (see Section 13 on critical raw materials (CRMs) in this publication). A similar situation relates to Europe’s efforts towards a full-fledged energy transition, its demand for green hydrogen, and greater energy independence from Russia, which needs to be balanced with African priorities for improving energy access for its people. The issue of debt sustainability is another key issue the EU must handle very carefully, not least since this issue was one of the key criticisms of China’s BRI and one which China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) is now trying to be address. As China seems to be moving away with the GDI from large infrastructure projects and towards smaller and financially more sustainable projects, the EU needs to carefully balance its desire for visibility with an approach that runs the risk of repeating policies that slowly appear outdated.
The value-based agenda is in fact a key point of difference from China’s BRI, but also the most difficult for Europe to implement. So far, the issue of linking the Global Gateway to a value-based agenda has received only marginal attention, mainly as the EU’s search for energy and raw materials and efforts to diversify its supply chains entails working closely with autocratic regimes (see Section 7 in this publication). For the next EU leadership, the question whether the EU accepts that it must support, and through this also strengthen, autocratic regimes with large infrastructure projects, needs to be addressed much more openly (see also Section 5 in this publication). At the present time, the EU’s approach to doing so within the Global Gateway predominantly revolves around integrating social and human rights standards into its infrastructure projects. However, this narrow focus falls short of establishing the Global Gateway as a viable alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Moreover, the larger the volume of investment generated and the closer to the partner’s interests, the bigger the potential “soft power” leverage for the EU to pursue such objectives.
Looking ahead
To inform the next steps for the Global Gateway from a development perspective, the next EU leadership should consider the following actions and considerations:
First and foremost, the EU’s leadership needs to clarify whether the Global Gateway is intended to replace the EU’s development policy and constitutes de facto its new all-encompassing strategy. The political guidelines for the next European Commission suggest this, as they announce taking the Global Gateway “to the next level” by means of an integrated offer that extends the infrastructure investment with accompanying trade policy actions and macro-economic support (also known as “budget support”) (von der Leyen, 2024, p. 27). It remains to be seen in what form and how such integrated offers will be offered, though the announced revamping of the EU’s external action financing suggests important steps are being considered in this regard (von der Leyen, 2024, p. 29). Such a clarification must take place in parallel with the development of a new narrative (see Introduction in this publication), as the further development of Global Gateway and the reorientation of the EU’s development policy are mutually dependent.
Plans, however, need adequate resources and commitment to be realised. The ultimate test for this will be budgetary implications and the continued existence and political visibility of development policy priorities outside the Global Gateway. The question of how the Global Gateway could also be implemented in fragile states is a key issue in this respect and currently already being discussed at the EU level (see Section 6 on fragile states in this publication). Other pressing issues – in fact the EU’s main priority in development according to the Lisbon Treaty – relate to poverty reduction and inequality in and between states, issues the Global Gateway has so far left outside its goals catalogue. In addition, given the prevailing trend of autocratisation and the ensuing systemic rivalry, the EU must find a way to navigate engagements with authoritarian governments within Global Gateway projects.
For this purpose, the EU should allocate significant resources to comprehending local political dynamics, particularly within sectors involved in Global Gateway initiatives. This understanding is vital to reducing the probability that these projects do not inadvertently reinforce oppressive regimes. Moreover, the EU must ensure balanced engagement by actively involving these countries and their civil societies in democracy support through its development cooperation programmes (see Section 7 in this publication). It is imperative to avoid the unilateral and uncritical promotion of infrastructure development, emphasising comprehensive engagement that aligns with democratic principles and human rights. One way of doing this is to propose that any EU-funded project go through a local consultation process, so that the people impacted by it (both positively and negatively) can have their say at the planning stage. This means extra bureaucracy, but it also means better information all round. This would also address another key weakness of the Global Gateway that relates to the involvement of partners in the design and implementation of Global Gateway projects, also to secure their ownership.
Internally, matters related to decision-making should be addressed and streamlined. The process whereby flagship initiatives are determined by the Commission/European External Action Service (EEAS) and its member states remains opaque, with the public finding out about decisions made by means of long lists of project titles. Moreover, particularly if the Global Gateway will in future indeed eclipse the EU’s development policy, the democratic scrutiny of the European Parliament over the Global Gateway needs to be considered.
Finally, the package of policy proposals for the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework for the period 2028-2034, expected to be published in 2025, will be key to consider the further integration and next steps for the Global Gateway. One possibility would be to incorporate the Global Gateway into the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI/GE). This would also allow one to further determine a common strategic outlook for the five thematic priorities of the Global Gateway and further define its objectives between the European Commission, Council, and Parliament.
The litmus test for the success of the Global Gateway ultimately hinges on the extent to which the initiative is able to make the EU an attractive, reliable and effective partner in improving partner countries’ infrastructure and national development objectives. The EU’s own strategic objectives need to be weighed up against this objective, as geopolitical gains can only be made if partners consider the EU a trustworthy and strong partner, dedicated to promoting a joint agenda.
References
Financial Times. (11 May 2024). EU fighting to counter China’s influence in Global South, says top official. https://www.ft.com/content/690e65c5-ee93-4a21-b4c7-12110ae48984
von der Leyen, U. (2024). Europe’s choice: Political guidelines for the next European Commission: 2024-2029. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf
